

Discussion of
**“International Financial Flows
and Misallocation”**

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*The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Bank of England or its committees.

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- [4] Classify firms based on their productivity and financial constraints.
 - * D_i : High/Low dummy based on MRPK/TFPR and Total Assets.
- [5] Estimate which firms benefited more from increase in credit supply.
 - * Same estimator as in [3], by D_i .

This paper: What did I learn?

- ▶ Banks that relied more on foreign funding before the shock increased their credit supply relatively more than the average bank.

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- ▶ Increased credit supply was directed to high-productivity, high collateral firms:

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- ▶ But also: to low collateral firms, conditional on being high productivity.

My comments

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- ▶ Some issues for discussion:
 - [#1] Persistence.
 - [#2] Identification of the push shock.
 - [#3] Sorting of banks and firms.
 - [#4] Triple interactions.

[#1] Persistence

- ▶ Baseline specification:

$$\ln C_{ibt} = \alpha_{ib} + \alpha_{it} + \beta (\text{Exp}_b \times \text{Post}_t) + \dots + \epsilon_{ibt}$$

- ▶ Log-level of outstanding credit ($\ln C_{ibt}$) surely is highly persistent. Problematic.

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- ▶ Log-level of outstanding credit ($\ln C_{ibt}$) surely is highly persistent. Problematic.
- ▶ Including $\ln C_{ib,t-1}$ to control for persistence leads to standard bias in dynamic panel regressions.
- ▶ Safer to estimate:

$$\Delta \ln C_{ibt} = \alpha_{ib} + \alpha_{it} + \beta (\text{Exp}_b \times \text{Post}_t) + \dots + \epsilon_{ibt}$$

↙ FIRST DIFF.

[#2] Identification of a push shock to capital flows

- ▶ $Post_t$: time dummy equal to 1 from 2002, and 0 otherwise.
 - * Sharp acceleration in Italian banks' foreign liabilities (KF_t^{IT}) from 2002:Q3.
 - * Literature attributes much of this increase to push factors.
[Lane (2013), Hale and Obstfeld (2016), Amiti et al. (2017)]

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- ▶ Can do better than that! Some issues:
 - * A big fraction (but surely not all) of KF_t^{IT} was driven by global factors.
 - * Need to take a stand on the timing of the shock.
 - * Don't fully exploit time variation in your data set.

[#2] Identification of a push shock to capital flows

- ▶ Can isolate the component of KF_t^I that is due to push factors with a small open economy assumption. [Cesa-Bianchi, Ferrero, Rebucci (2018)]

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- ▶ E.g.: Project log-changes of Italian banks' foreign liabilities on their world counterpart:

$$\Delta KF_t^{IT} = c + \lambda \Delta KF_t + \varepsilon_t^{IT}, \quad \text{with } KF_t = \sum_k KF_t^k \quad \forall k \neq IT$$

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
- ▶ Fitted value $\hat{\lambda} \Delta KF_t$ can be interpreted as the component of ΔKF_t^{IT} that is driven by push factors.
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- ▶ Then, can estimate:

$$\Delta \ln C_{ibt} = \alpha_{ib} + \alpha_{it} + \beta \left(\text{Exp}_b \times \hat{\lambda} \Delta KF_t \right) + \dots + \epsilon_{ibt}$$

↓ FIRST DIFF. ↓ PUSH SHOCK

[#2] Identification of a push shock to capital flows



NOTE. Fitted values from a regression of the log-change in the stock of Italy foreign liabilities (ΔKF_t^{IT}) on a constant and the log-change in the global stock on foreign liabilities (ΔKF_t). The solid blue line plots $\hat{\lambda} \Delta KF_t$. The solid yellow line plot $Post_t$ rescaled by a factor of 4.

[#3.1] Sorting of banks by exposure to push shock

- ▶ Exp_b : Share of foreign liabilities over total liabilities for bank b over the 1998-2000 period.
- ▶ **Main idea** Banks with high Exp_b over 1998-2000 have a greater funding opportunity from push shock in 2002-2007.
- ▶ **Assumption** Difficult/costly for lenders to change their liability structure.

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- ▶ How reasonable is this ex-ante classification?

[#3.1] Sorting of banks by exposure to push shock

- ▶ Large degree of persistence in the share of foreign liabilities when comparing 1998-2000 vs 2002-2007 averages.

	(1) Share of total inflows (02-07)	(2) Growth of foreign liabilities (post vs. pre)	(3) Rank foreign liability ratio (02-07)
Foreign liability ratio (98-00)	0.54*** (0.03)	0.51*** (0.04)	
Rank foreign liability ratio (98-00)			0.75*** (0.03)
Bank Controls	✓	✓	✓
Observations	494	494	494
<i>Adj. R</i> ²	0.80	0.63	0.71

[#3.1] Sorting of banks by exposure to push shock

- ▶ Large degree of persistence in the share of foreign liabilities when comparing 1998-2000 vs 2002-2007 averages.
- ▶ Additional evidence welcome:
 - * How does the 1998 vs. 2007 scatter look like?
 - * How does the distribution of Exp_b look like over time?

[#3.2] Sorting of firms by productivity and financial constraints

- ▶ D_i : firm dummy equal to 1 if a firm characteristic over the 1998-2000 period is greater than its sectorial average, and 0 otherwise.
 - * Firms sorted by productivity (MRPK/TFPR) and collateral constraints (Total Assets).

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 - * Firms sorted by productivity (MRPK/TFPR) and collateral constraints (Total Assets).
- ▶ Again, some concerns about ex-ante classification (firm life-cycle dynamics).
- ▶ **Alternative** Data allows to compute D_i by year. Then, can estimate:

$$\Delta \ln C_{ibt} = \alpha_{ib} + \alpha_{it} + \beta^{High} \left(D_{i,t-1}^{High} \times Exp_{b,t-1} \times \hat{\lambda} \Delta KF_t \right) + \beta^{Low} \left(D_{i,t-1}^{Low} \times Exp_{b,t-1} \times \hat{\lambda} \Delta KF_t \right) + \dots + \epsilon_{ibt}$$

FIRST DIFF. FIRM DUMMY IN t-1 BANK EXPOSURE IN t-1 PUSH SHOCK

[#4] Sharpening the inference: Triple interactions

- ▶ Bank-firm-time dimension not fully exploited \Rightarrow Can add bank-time fixed effects.
 - * Control for both observed and unobserved time-varying heterogeneity at firm and bank level. [[Jimenez et al. \(2014\)](#)]

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- ▶ Triple interaction regression:

$$\Delta \ln C_{ibt} = \alpha_{ib} + \alpha_{bt} + \alpha_{it} + \beta \left(D_{i,t-1}^{High} \times Exp_{b,t-1} \times \hat{\lambda} \Delta KF_t \right) + \dots + \epsilon_{ibt}$$

FIRST DIFF. FIRM DUMMY IN $t-1$ BANK EXPOSURE IN $t-1$ PUSH SHOCK

BANK-TIME FE

- ▶ β captures increase in credit supplied by a bank that is *relatively* more exposed to push shock to a firm that is *relatively* more productive.

Other points

Financial constraints

- ▶ Size (**Total Assets**) used as a proxy for firms' financial constraints.
- ▶ Many other dimensions to consider:
 - * Leverage, age, liquid assets, etc.
 - * Should add all of them in the triple interaction regression.

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Standard errors

- ▶ Standard errors clustered at the bank-sector (2 digits) level. Should be more conservative?
 - * Two-way clustering by bank and year.

In sum: Great paper on an important question

- ▶ Big issue of whether (cross-border) credit gets allocated to high productivity firms.
 - * E.g.: southern Europe productivity slowdown.
- ▶ **This paper** Exploits granular bank-firm-time data to provide evidence on capital flows and misallocation.

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 - * Identification of the push shock in the time series.
 - * Sharper inference in the cross-section.

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- ▶ Can provide (even) more convincing evidence.
 - * Identification of the push shock in the time series.
 - * Sharper inference in the cross-section.
- ▶ Looking forward to future versions!